This chapter examines the dynamics of elections in New York State, and explores the ways in which citizens participate in the political process. A central focus of the chapter concerns the shift from party dominated to candidate centered elections. Today candidates for both statewide and legislative offices run their own campaigns in large part and rely increasingly on money, marketing, and incumbency to appeal to the voters. While statewide races in New York are often competitive, legislative races for both the Assembly and Senate tend to be lopsided affairs. Next, voter participation in regards to both turnout and voting behavior is examined. Finally, many states have attempted to “reform” the electoral process by enacting campaign finance changes or term limits, and other states allow for ample use of direct democracy methods, such as initiatives and referendums. 

Elections in New York and across the nation were traditionally dominated by the presence of the two major parties. In the party centered era, citizens based their vote heavily on the party cue, and independent voting and ticket splitting were rare. In addition, since party allegiance was deeply held most voters were consistent in their voting habits over time and voting patterns were less susceptible to short term changes. Candidates in this electoral environment had ample incentives to emphasize their party label in order to motivate their supporters, and maintain the backing of party leaders. Moreover, in the party centered era elections were more labor intensive and the party was the chief source of “foot soldiers” that were needed to reach and mobilize the voters. In other words, the dynamics of party dominated elections were mutually reinforcing so that party officials, candidates, and voters were all bound together in elections through party allegiance. While all of these party elements continue to be important in elections today, a shift has occurred towards candidate centered elections.

Today, candidates are self-starters in many cases. Individual candidates build their own organizations, raise money independently, hire consultants, and use personalized appeals to get elected. Especially in state legislative races, incumbency is an important resource since it helps secure favorable name recognition that is crucial to winning elections. The importance of name recognition means that individual legislators spend considerable energy and resources to remain visible in their district. Activities such as mailings, constituency service, and attendance at community events all fulfill representative functions and keep office holders in the public eye. In today’s dealigned voter environment in which more people are independents and “swing” voters, it makes perfect sense to appeal to voters in a nonpartisan fashion. The bottom line today is that candidates depend increasingly on their own efforts, and appeal to voters on an individual basis in addition to party affiliation. 

Statewide elections, especially for Governor, are interesting to observe since they are candidate centered and often competitive. For example, in 1982 Mario Cuomo narrowly won the Governorship over Lew Lehrman in a hotly contested race, yet in 1986 and 1990 Cuomo met minimal opposition and won handily on both occasions. Four years later, though, the power of incumbency that carried Cuomo to big victories seemed to be a burden in his narrow loss to George Pataki. In a mirror image to Cuomo’s large reelection margin in 1986, Governor Pataki coasted to an overwhelming victory over Democrat Peter Vallone in 1998. As these electoral results indicate, Gubernatorial elections in New York are the political equivalent of a roller coaster ride. Yet while the results seem to ebb and flow, the underlying factors which operate in New York politics are more consistent. In large part, the electoral results of the last sixteen years are due to the nature of candidate centered elections, money, voter moderation and independence, and economic cycles.

Gubernatorial elections in New York are increasingly influenced by the short term factors often associated with candidate centered elections. For instance, the candidates appeal to the voters through the high tech means of the mass media, and political consultants more often develop campaign themes than state party leaders. Given the importance of media buys on all statewide races, including the governor’s race, it is not surprising that candidates have to continually raise money to make a good showing. In 1994, George Pataki’s expenditures of $14.6 million actually eclipsed the $8.2 million total spent by incumbent Mario Cuomo. Governor Pataki set a New York record for a governor’s race spending $20 million in 1998, while Democratic challenger Peter Vallone spent an additional $6 million. The need for ample resources, though, is not contained to the Governor’s race, since Attorney General contests and U.S. Senate elections have skyrocketed financially as well. In the 1998 Senate contest between D’Amato and Schumer the candidates combined to spend over $33 million in which most of the funds supported a negative “air war” of advertising. 

Voting behavior in today’s elections plays a key role in the volatile nature of the statewide elections. The dynamics of voting turnout is one factor that influences the outcome. In 1994, there is no doubt that the vast differences in voter turnout across the regions of the state aided Governor Pataki in is victory since most upstate counties had turnout from over 70% of registered citizens, while the voting in New York City only equaled 40% of those registered. In turn, in 1998 Charles Schumer was helped by a slight turnout resurgence in New York City while the expected huge margin for Pataki dampened turnout in many upstate counties. In the last forty years, not only has turnout gone down in elections, but also those individuals who make up the voting population in any given election are less predictable. The fact that New York holds its gubernatorial election in non-presidential years adds to the unpredictable nature of voting strength. Moreover, as noted previously, a growing number of New Yorkers are independents and “swing” voters adding to the uncertainty in elections. Former Governor Cuomo seemed invincible in 1986 when not only did he win the New York City vote easily, but he also garnered 62% of the votes upstate! In the 1994 election, Cuomo earned a meager 32% of the upstate vote in a dramatic turnaround. In addition, Governor Pataki narrowly won in the suburbs in 1994, yet averaged over 62% of the vote from the New York City suburbs in the 1998 election. Senator Schumer’s victory in 1998 was secured in part by the fact that he held his own in the suburban pockets of the state, areas that D’Amato had won handily in his last two elections. Clearly, the long term structure of the vote once provided by party cues has eroded in New York especially in balloting for Governor and U.S. Senate.

A final aspect of Gubernatorial races in the candidate centered era is that while the victories often provide personal mandates, broader changes in party power and allegiance are more elusive. One factor that plays a role here is that in the age of dealignment, voters increasingly use retrospective voting as a guide. In other words, many voters assess the governor by the nature of the state’s economy, and reward those candidates who preside in good economic times, yet the vote may not indicate a clear preference for the kind of policy changes the future should bring. This development mirrors the dynamic of recent presidential elections in which incumbents are voted out based on economic woes, such as George Bush in 1992 and Jimmy Carter in 1980. On the other hand, incumbent presidents who serve during times of prosperity often win handily, yet “coast” to victory on a “feel good” campaign, Presidents Reagan and Clinton campaigned in this fashion in 1984 and 1996. Similarly, Governor Cuomo in 1986 and Governor Pataki in 1998 won elections easily yet did not offer definitive agendas during the campaign. Further evidence of the personal mandates earned in the candidate centered era are the disconnected campaigns of the Governor and their party members in the state legislature. In 1998, while governor Pataki won a strong victory, the state legislature maintained the status quo in both the Senate and the Assembly. In short, the notion of “shrinking coattails” captures the dynamics by which gubernatorial and legislative races produce contrasting partisan outcomes. In fact, in some Assembly districts in which Pataki won handily, Assembly members, such as Paul Tonko, won with over 65% of the vote. The bottom line in our candidate centered age is that while individual candidates often reach high popularity, the prospects for governing are increasingly tricky. 

One interesting fact about legislative elections in New York is that over 98% of incumbents win reelection, yet the public support for the legislature across the state is often low. This puzzle can be explained by examining the four key aspects of state legislative races; partisan composition of the district, incumbency advantages, challenger quality, and the role of money. Generally, these four pieces fit together in such a way that incumbent office holders win handily usually with over 60% of the vote. In fact, in the 211 Assembly and Senate districts that exist across the state only a small number of incumbents failed to secure 60% of the vote in the 1998 elections. Yet in today’s candidate centered era, while most incumbents seem “safe” they “run scared” because of the potentially unpredictable nature of electoral politics.

The nature of legislative districts is one aspect of legislative elections that needs to be explored. There are 150 Assembly districts in the state each of which contains about 120,000 people. In addition, there are 61 Senate districts in which approximately 290,000 citizens reside. State legislators in both houses in New York run for reelection every two years in even numbered years. The composition of the legislative districts is determined based on the census that is taken every ten years, and following the census the legislature adopts a redistricting plan. Thirty-nine states use legislative approval for this process while the remaining states employ an appointed commission to undertake design and ratification of the redistricting plan. Redistricting is, at bottom, a political process and since New York has split party control each House tends to safeguard its incumbent members. Overall, most legislators represent districts in which they share partisan ties with a clear majority of their constituents, yet there are exceptions to this pattern. For instance, Republican Senator Maltese represents a Queens district in which Democrats outnumber Republicans by two to one. In short, though, since most incumbents represent districts with a built in majority it provides a serious edge in the November elections. 

The candidates who chose to run make a crucial difference in the election outcomes well. New York State has a high level of careerism in the legislature meaning that most legislators view their seat as a full time job and see politics as a lifetime career. Consequently, an overwhelming number of incumbents choose to run for reelection, and this dynamics shapes the competitiveness of legislative elections. As noted previously, incumbents enjoy a number of advantages that help them represent their constituents and remain visible in the district. Most members are in sync with the basic philosophy of their district, and they are careful to stay within the parameters of district opinion especially on key issues. In addition, legislators routinely send out constituent mailings, make public appearances, and gain credit for the “projects” that assist their communities. Moreover, staff are available to help citizens with a number of constituent service activities and to facilitate favorable publicity in the local media. It should also be noted that most legislators work very had to maintain the trust and support of citizens that reside in their district. The emergence of a credible challenger is essential to making an election competitive, yet in many races this outcome does not occur. In fact, in the 1994 legislative elections over a third of Senate incumbents faced no challenger at all, and nearly a fifth of Assembly members ran unopposed. The strongest challengers tend to be individuals who hold office already at the county or local level, yet these individuals are usually acutely aware of the hurdles that they would face against a popular incumbent. The best challengers normally wait until an “open’ seat occurs or a scandal or big issue comes along that can be effectively used in the campaign. In the absence of an open or “marginal” seat, many challengers who do run have little political experience and, therefore, this result adds to the invincibility of the incumbent. 

The last piece of the legislative election puzzle is the role of money in the campaign. Money has become crucially important today since campaigns have become more expensive, and in some respects voters are harder to reach. Money in campaigns comes from a few types of sources; individuals, political actions committees (PAC’s), and legislative campaign committees. Most candidates receive the largest share of money from individuals, and PAC money is the next largest type of contributor. PAC money comes from a variety of organizations, such as business groups, unions, and occupational associations, among others. Not only has this source of money become more important as party help has declined, but PAC money goes disproportionately to incumbents given their strong chances of winning. In addition, as noted in chapter 3, interest groups provide candidate endorsements, and in today’s dealigned environment, these signs of support can carry weight among particular voting groups. Another source of campaign support comes from the legislative campaign committees. During the 1998 election cycle the party majorities in the Assembly and Senate raised over 4 million dollars to help their candidates. The LCC’s are very strategic with their funds and normally give the bulk of this money to candidates in marginal districts or in open seats. The effect of this party money tends to reinforce the competitiveness of these contests, yet does little to alter the vast majority of districts where lopsided elections occur.

Money plays two roles in state legislative races. Money buys resources needed for a credible campaign and incumbents can use it to deter quality challengers from running. Today it is not uncommon for Assembly candidates to raise over $100,000 dollars and for Senate candidates to raise over $250,000 to run strong, media oriented campaigns. Since candidates rely less on party volunteers than in the past, campaign communications usually involve a combination of direct mail, media buys (radio and television), polling, and phone banks. Moreover, many legislative candidates employ consultants to help run their campaigns making them “high tech, capital intensive” events. In addition, since the emergence of a strong challenger can make a race competitive, many incumbents raise money for preemptive purposes meaning that money in the bank is a deterrent to potential challengers. Although most legislative races are one-sided affairs, legislators know that ample money in the bank is one way to further limit the uncertainty that any election can bring. 

The most basic form of participation in our democracy is voting, yet only half of the eligible voting age population cast ballots in the 1996 presidential election year. Across the fifty states, though, there is a big difference in turnout rates. In 1996, Vermont had the highest state level turnout with 72% participation, yet Nevada had the lowest level of voting with merely 38% turnout. New York’s turnout rate of 47% was slightly below the national average of 49%, and placed the empire state in the bottom half of voting participation in the fifty states. Not only are turnout rates highly variable across the nation, but fewer people are voting today than in the past. For instance, in the 1960 presidential election 66% of the eligible New Yorkers cast ballots, and over the last thirty years that number has declined steadily.

There are three central factors that seem to account for dynamics of voting turnout today. The first factor is that nonvoting is skewed demographically, since individuals who are less educated, poor, younger, and racial minorities tend to vote less frequently. Since people in these demographic categories tend to be Democrats, this pattern is one major reason why Democratic turnout in New York is always considerably less than among Republican voters. Moreover, it generally holds true that people who identify with a political party are more likely to vote than independents. Yet demographics are not the only factor to be considered here, since legal aspects of voting play a role as well. Registration laws across the fifty states vary enormously in terms of closing dates. In New York, a person needs to be registered thirty days before the next election in order to participate, which generally means by early October for the November general election. This requirement is one of the more restrictive since many states require less time between registering and voting. Three states-Maine, Minnesota and Wisconsin-allow for same day registration, and not surprisingly registration and turnout are near the highest in the nation there. Since the passage of the Motor Voter legislation turnout has gone up across the nation, and in New York the number of registered voters increased by almost 8% between 1992 and 1996. In addition, some states have begun to experiment with mail in voting, such as Oregon, or extending the voting period over several days. These legal changes in the voting environment have been accompanied with increased turnout in those states. A final legal aspect is that many statewide and state legislative races are held in off year elections in which turnout tends to be around 35-38%. 

The third factor affecting turnout rates is political in nature, namely the extent of electoral competition. Generally, competitive races garner more attention and media coverage, and voters see a motivation to get the polls. Especially in competitive seats where the candidates hold clear and contrasting positions, voters are more likely to be activated and cast their ballots. When the vote outcome appears to be lopsided, voter participation tends to be adversely affected. Moreover, many people believe that today’s high tech, media campaigns and the lack of grassroots mobilization efforts make citizens disengaged from elections. In short, a number of individual and environmental factors are associated with low voting rates not only in New York, but also across the nation.

When people do cast ballots, a couple of major factors determine an individual’s vote choice. Although dealignment is a central characteristic of American politics today, partisanship still plays a large role in structuring the vote choice for many voters. About two-thirds of the voting population identifies with one of the major parties, and in competitive races most partisans support their candidate. For instance, in the 1998 U.S. Senate race between D’Amato and Schumer, 80% of Republicans voted for D’Amato while 85% of the Democrats opted for Schumer. When a popular incumbent runs, though, more “out party” voters select the current office holder than normal. In the 1998 governor’s race, Governor Pataki actually won 27% of the Democratic vote, yet Peter Vallone got only 6% of the Republican vote. In addition, more voters are independents than in the past, and these voters are increasingly crucial in close, statewide races. Independents are usually strong supporters of popular incumbents, yet vote more evenly in competitive races. In 1998, Pataki had a 32% margin over Vallone among this voting group, while Schumer held a 50% to 48% advantage among independents. There is no doubt that as party identification among the electorate has eroded, candidate and issue concerns have risen to the forefront. This trend generally favors incumbents, although statewide candidates are a bit more vulnerable than state legislators. Across the nation while over 75% of governors win reelection, over 90% of state legislators win. As noted earlier, Governors can take the fall for an economic downturn, and often face stronger challengers as well. At the state legislative level, a mixture of partisanship and incumbency propel most office holders to reelection. Since most legislative races are noncompetitive they receive little media attention, and in this environment three out of four independents vote for the incumbent. Unless a scandal or divisive issue occurs, it is difficult for most challengers of either party to get political traction. In essence, the legislators are well known but their often weak challengers are not. These political dynamics lead to a high degree of ticket splitting, which results in diverse electoral outcomes and divided government control. 

Throughout the nation many states have been “laboratories of change” when it comes to reforming elections in recent years. Two approaches designed to directly change campaigns and elections are campaign finance laws and term limits. Almost half of the states have enacted some type of campaign finance changes in recent years. The motivation for these changes stems from the enormous fund raising advantages incumbents have over challengers, the role of money in influencing policy, and the preoccupation of candidates concerning raising funds. These money reforms have ranged from modest changes, such as disclosure laws, to public financing for candidates that Maine approved recently. Most states, though, have tightened contribution limits and limited candidate spending. In New York, while computerized disclosure of campaign records was mandated and took effect in July 1999, further changes are only beginning to be debated. Governor Pataki recently announced a new package of reforms involving contribution limits and curbing “soft” money, yet the fate of campaign finance reform in New York remains to be seen. In addition, term limits have been enacted in 18 states for legislators and 38 states limit the governor’s terms. In New York, though, any serious discussion of term limits has existed only at the local levels, and term limits in New York City have garnered considerable attention.

A second type of reform, citizen lawmaking, gives the people the power to directly vote on state issues, rather than attempting to fix the electoral process itself. The two kinds of direct democracy methods are initiatives and popular referendums. The initiative process involves petition gathering and when enough petitions are filed, the measure is put before the voters. Popular referendums involve direct citizen voting on legislation that the state legislature has already acted on. Approximately half of the fifty states have some combination of initiative and referendum processes. In New York, while the initiative and popular referendum methods do not exist, limited referendums on constitutional amendments and bond issues, such as the environmental bond acts, are available. Not only have more states used these direct democracy methods in recent years, but also the number of measures on the ballot across the country has skyrocketed in recent years. These measures range from the mundane, such as Louisiana’s renaming of the university system board of trustees, to highly controversial votes, such as recent ballot measures regarding affirmative action and immigration in California. While generally these citizen lawmaking measures occur more frequently in the states west of the Mississippi River, the voters of Maine have decided the fate of important clear cutting and campaign finance issues in recent years.